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A tax enforcement regime must have well-calibrated audit policies and penalties to ensure compliance and revenue collection. The private nature of a taxpayer's income makes this calibration difficult in theory and in practice. Often, however, the authority or bureau in charge of enforcing a tax code also has enforcement-relevant private information. Specifically, it knows how good it is at detecting hidden income or uncovering other transgressions. A strong bureau has capacity to uncover hidden income while a weak bureau does not.
1 A taxpayer's beliefs about the bureau's effectiveness feed directly into compliance incentives. If he believes the authority is weak, non-compliance is tempting since meaningful sanction is unlikely. We argue that enforcement practices can inform those beliefs with many implications for equilibrium audit efficacy.
In this note we construct a simple model with double-sided private information where an agency's auditing mechanism may signal enforcement-relevant information. We formalize three main conclusions. First, a weak bureau may be able to masquerade as a strong agency.
We call this "thrifty enforcement" as the bureau need not have (possibly costly) capacity to perform its mission-the agent must simply think it does. Surprisingly, this outcome is possible only if the bureau cannot impose large penalties. Second, it may be costly for a strong bureau to reveal its type convincingly. Revelation may require wasteful expenditures. Finally, we show that when penalties for non-compliance are too large, compliance is necessarily imperfect. This contrasts with classic results on law enforcement with risk-neutral agents (Becker, 1968) .
Since Allingham and Sandmo (1972) a large literature has considered the design of auditing regimes. The problem's modern formulation was provided by Reinganum and Wilde (1985) and expanded upon by Border and Sobel (1987) , Mookherjee and Png (1989) , and Chander and Wilde (1998) . Our model is closest in spirit to Cronshaw and Alm (1995) . In their analysis, the taxpayer knows his own income and the tax authority has private information regarding its audit costs and audit effectiveness. We model audit effectiveness similarly but our model differs in terms of timing and the bureau's commitment ability. They do not study the signaling implications of audit mechanisms. Snow and Warren (2005) also consider a setting with imperfect audit effectiveness. We elaborate on the policy and legal implications of our analysis in Kotowski et al. (2013) , which draws on the model and results developed below.
Model
The agent ("taxpayer") must pay tax on his income. It is common knowledge that with probability f 0 his income is low (w 0 ) and with probability f 1 it is high (w 1 ). The agent's income (i.e. type) is his private information. Let t(w) be the statutory tax liability of an agent with income w. To simplify exposition, let t i ≡ t(w i ) and (without loss of generality) set t 0 = 0. The agent is risk-neutral and would like to minimize his payments to the government. The principal ("bureau" or "tax authority") is an enforcement agency charged with collecting tax. The bureau has a privately-known type, s ∈ {0, 1}. The bureau's type is a parameter determining its auditing effectiveness, as we describe further below. It is common knowledge that the bureau is of type s with probability g s .
Ideally, the bureau would like an agent with income w to pay t(w) in taxes out of his own initiative. Obviously, such an outcome is unlikely. Following common practice, the bureau administers a self-reporting taxation scheme with ex post auditing to incentivize compliance.
The idea should be familiar to anyone who has paid income tax and is summarized by the timeline in Figure 1. 1. Aware of its type, the bureau announces and commits to an enforcement mechanism α, β . 2 The mechanism specifies an audit rule (α) and a post-audit payment schedule (β).
2. Aware of α, β and his income, the taxpayer submits an income report,ŵ.
3. An agent reportingŵ is audited with probability α(ŵ). The cost of an audit to the bureau is c > 0.
(a) If no audit occurs, the agent pays t(ŵ) in taxes.
(b) If an audit occurs, its outcome depends on the bureau's type. If the bureau is of type s = 1, the agent's true income is revealed. Otherwise, the audit is inconclusive and confirms the agent's original declaration.
3 If w a is the agent's audit-identified income, he must pay β(ŵ, w a ).
2 The issue of commitment has received considerable attention in the auditing literature. See, for example, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) or Khalil (1997) .
3 Cronshaw and Alm (1995) relate audit effectiveness to the principal's type similarly. Given the role of s, we call a type-1 bureau "strong" and a type-0 bureau "weak." In crafting an enforcement mechanism, the bureau's goal is to maximize collected receipts net of audit costs, i.e. its "profits." The bureau is risk-neutral.
We do not allow the bureau to employ any α, β , as this would be empirically and technically misguided. Often, enforcement agencies must work within commonly-accepted bounds or laws. Definition 1. Letβ > 0. The mechanism α, β is feasible (with respect toβ) if: (i) the bureau cannot impose a penalty greater thanβ, i.e. β(ŵ, w a ) ≤β; (ii) the bureau cannot reward an audited agent, i.e. β(ŵ, w a ) ≥ t(ŵ); and, (iii) the bureau cannot penalize an agent who overstates his audit-determined income, i.e.ŵ ≥ w a =⇒ β(ŵ, w a ) ≤ t(ŵ).
Feasible mechanisms capture many real-world practices. The bound on β(ŵ, w a ) rules out "optimal" but pathological enforcement schemes that rely on arbitrarily harsh punishments (Becker, 1968) . Typically, maximum penalties are codified by legislators and an enforcement agency, such as the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, is given discretion within some range. Reflecting common practice, we preclude rewarding an agent who experiences the unpleasantries of an audit.
By restricting attention to feasible mechanisms, we can identify the post-audit payment function with a single number, denoted by β, which equals the levy imposed after a discovered underreport.
4 When describing a mechanism we will at most specify the triplet α 0 , α 1 , and β, where α i is the probability that an agent reporting w i is audited. An enforcement strategy for a type-s principal is a probability distribution over feasible mechanisms. A reporting strategy for a type-w taxpayer specifies a probability distribution over income reports for each feasible enforcement mechanism. Our solution concept is (weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
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Before turning to the analysis, we record a maintained assumption.
This assumption ensures that a strong bureau does not opt to not audit simply because auditing is too expensive, type-w 1 agents are too rare, or allowable penalties are too low. It ensures our conclusions are not trivial. All proofs are in the appendix.
Analysis
An initial observation regarding the agent's behavior is immediate. We henceforth assume that a type-w 0 agent always reports w 0 .
As a benchmark, suppose the bureau's type is known. If the bureau is weak (g 0 = 1), the situation is trivial. The agent always reports w 0 and no tax is collected. If the bureau is strong (g 1 = 1), our model reproduces a classic result in the auditing literature. The bureau audits low reports, but this is an (ex post) superfluous activity.
Proposition 1. Suppose g 1 = 1. The optimal enforcement mechanism is such that α * 0 = t 1 /β, α * 1 = 0, and β * =β. The agent truthfully reports his income. Now suppose g s ∈ (0, 1). As in most signaling games, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. Moreover, our flexible parameterization implies many cases. To highlight our framework's interesting conclusions we emphasize equilibria where the agent complies with the prevailing law-at least when facing a strong bureau. This is analogous to the result in Proposition 1 and would be of practical interest to policy makers. As we detail below, such equilibria may not always exist. Result 1: Thrifty Enforcement. In analogy to physical exercise, it is often costly for a bureau to become strong. Developing a capacity to identify hidden income, for example, may necessitate hiring more capable staff. In lieu of such investments, a weak bureau may wish to adopt a strong agency's posture hoping that its stance is sufficiently convincing to beget compliance. If the agent cannot discern the bureau's strength, he may comply to hedge his bets. Such an outcome, however, is possible only when the admissible penalty structure meets several key bounds.
Proposition 2. There exists a pooling equilibrium where a type-w 1 agent truthfully reports his type if and only if t 1 /g 1 ≤β ≤ c/g 0 .
When a weak bureau mimics a strong bureau, it imposes a negative externality on its stronger counterpart. The bound onβ stops the equilibrium's unraveling by preventing the strong bureau from profitably "de-pooling" to an alternative enforcement scheme.
Result 2: Costly Revelation. Sometimes a strong bureau may wish to project its strength. In a separating equilibrium, weak and strong bureaus employ different mechanisms, say m 0 and m 1 respectively. Thus, the agent can infer the bureau's type from the prevailing regime. Clearly, a type-w 1 agent will report w 0 when he is convinced that the bureau is weak. Hence, a weak bureau collects zero revenue in a separating equilibrium.
Therefore, m 1 must generate even less revenue when employed by a weak bureau.
Proposition 3. There exists a separating equilibrium where a type-w 1 agent truthfully reports his type to a type-1 bureau if and only ifβ ≤ c/f 1 .
As outlined in proposition's proof, a strong bureau may engage in "wasteful expenditures" to add credence to its signal.
6 The associated intuition is analogous to Spence (1973) .
Result 3: High Penalties and Non-Compliance. In the preceding two cases, to ensure truthful reporting the maximal admissible penalty (β) could not be too large. Whenβ exceeds those thresholds, compliance become imperfect.
Proposition 4. Suppose c/g 0 <β and c/f 1 <β. In every equilibrium a type-w 1 agent underreports his income with strictly positive probability to a strong bureau.
A policy implication of Proposition 4 is that compliance may improve following a reduction in the admissible penalties. Although large penalties imply complex taxpayer behavior, they also impact the kinds of audit schemes the tax authority may employ in an equilibrium. Pooling equilibria, for example, may no longer be attainable even when agent compliance is imperfect.
Proposition 5. Suppose c/f 1 <β < c(2 − f 1 )/f 1 and c/g 0 <β. There does not exist a pooling equilibrium.
Given Proposition 5, it is natural to ask what does happen when penalties are large? Here matters become complex and the equilibrium constructions are delicate. Proposition 4 ensures imperfect compliance by high income agents. At the same time, pooling and separating outcomes may be out of the question. Thus, a weak bureau may adopt a strategy of partial mimicry-implying a semi-separating equilibrium-as it randomizes between a revealing mechanism and the strong bureau's policy. The agent's imperfect compliance ensures that a weak bureau's return conditional on employing a strong bureau's strategy is not greater than that of a revealing policy.
Concluding Remarks
We have developed a model of tax enforcement where the enforcement mechanism can convey information regarding the principal's effectiveness in enforcing a law. Although we have phrased our model in a setting of auditing and tax compliance, analogous results continue to apply in any similarly-structured law-enforcement problem.
Our model suggests several avenues for future research. Endogenizing agents' tax liability or considering the full mechanism-design problem in an informed-principal setting are but two challenging opportunities.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. A bureau may employ a mechanism where either (i) a type-w 1 reports w 1 or (ii) a type-w 1 agent reports w 0 .
(i) If the bureau's mechanism encourages honest reporting, the optimal mechanism maximizes f 0 (−α 0 c) + f 1 (t 1 − α 1 c) subject to t 1 ≤ α 0 β. The solution is α 0 = t 1 /β, α 1 = 0, and β =β. The bureau's expected profits are f 1 t 1 − f 0 ct 1 /β. , it is sufficient to note that (i) t 1 /β < f 1 t 1 /(f 0 c) (by Assumption A-1) and that (ii) f 1 (t 1 /c − 1) /f 0 < 1.
7 m 1 generates expected profits of zero and a type-w 1 agent truthfully reports w 1 . If a type-w 1 agent reports only w 0 off of the equilibrium path,β ≤ c/f 1 ensures that a strong bureau does not have a profitable deviation.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is by contradiction. Let m 1 be a mechanism employed in equilibrium by a strong bureau. Suppose that a type-w 1 agent reports w 1 given m 1 . We will show that a strong bureau must also employ some other mechanism, after which a typew 1 agent reports w 0 with positive probability. Let g c. If instead a strong bureau employed a mechanism that audited low reports with frequency t 1 /β − ǫ and imposed a penalty ofβ, a type-w 1 agent would report w 0 . This would yield profits of (t 1 /β − ǫ)(f 1β − c), which is strictly positive because c/f 1 <β. Therefore, a strong bureau's equilibrium profits must be strictly positive as well. But this implies a weak bureau's equilibrium profits must also be strictly positive, as it could always m 1 guaranteeing itself the same profits.
An argument like that in the proof of Proposition 2 shows thatβ ≤ c/g m 1 0 . However, β > c/g 0 . Therefore, g m 1 0 < g 0 . Thus, there must exist some other mechanismm such that gm 0 > g 0 . Clearly, gm 0 < 1, else the mechanismm would generate zero profits for a weak bureau. Therefore a strong bureau must employm with some probability as well. If a type-w 1 agent always reported w 1 givenm, the same argument as above would imply that gm 0 < g 0 -a contradiction. Therefore, a type-w 1 agent must report w 0 with positive probability givenm.
7 The second claim is true since f 1β ≤ c =⇒ f 1 t 1 < c =⇒ f 1 t 1 − f 1 c < f 0 c =⇒ f 1 (t 1 − c) < f 0 c.
